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Muse: The First Amendment Rights of Public High School Students

KUHLMEIER v. HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRIC'. THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
INTRODUcTION

The first amendment to the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and
press to everyone under United States jurisdiction .' This amendment is the most
important of the first ten amendments in maintaining an ordered government
because it allows people to express opposing viewpoints openly. The Supreme
Court has held that the guarantees of the first amendment naturally extend to
students in a public high school setting. 2 The education process requires
scrupulous protection of children's constitutional freedoms
In Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District,the Supreme Court held that high
school students' first amendment rights were not violated when their principal
deleted articles from the school newspaper.4 The Court stated that the school
newspaper was not a "public forum" for expression which normally receives full
first amendment protection.5 The Court further held that the school principal did
not violate students' first amendment rights when he restricted the printing of articles due to the effect that they could have on other students
The Supreme Court's decision will undoubtedly curtail students' rights to
free speech and press. This casenote will first present a brief history of the first
amendment as it applies to public schools. An analysis of the Kuhlmeier decision
will follow, demonstrating why the Kuhlmeier holding represents a major step
backwards for both first amendment freedom and the American educational
process.
BACKGROUND

The Constitution places a duty upon the Supreme Court to protect free
speech.Y The Court has recognized that speech may be restricted in certain situa-

'U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
. ..." d.
2
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
3West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
4
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
5
1d. at 564. The term public forum includes traditional public places like streets and parks. If speech occurs
in a public forum, it can only be regulated in a narrow manner which is necessary to serve significant governmental interests. A non-public forum may be subject to greater governmental regulation.
6

1d. at 571.
7U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Similarly, Article
I]], § 2, cl. I of the Constitution states in part: "The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution...." (For the purposes of this casenote "speech" also refers to freedom of
the press).
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tions.8 The Court has indicated that restrictions on speech should be minute, and
carved out of the first amendment only when absolutely necessary to protect others

the protection
who may be harmed? The Supreme Court's methods for limiting
0 (1)content based
of the first amendment can be placed into three categories:'
2
prior restraint.' 3
regulations,'" (2) non-content based regulations,' and (3)

Content based regulations arise either because of the ideas or information
4
within the speech, or because of the general subject matter of the speech.' Content
a "clear and present
based regulations have been upheld when speech presents
6 is "obscene," 17 would
1
5
words,"
"fighting
danger" of illegal behavior, contains

9
involve a defamation suit, 18 contains false or misleading commercial speech, or
contains child pornography. 0
independent of its content.'
The state may also regulate speech for reasons
23 or physical manner 24 of the
22
Such restrictions focus on the time, location,
Doc'Goeking, Kuhlneierv. Hazelwood School District:Application of the PriorRestraint andPublic Forum
(citing
(1987)
889
L.Q.
CONST.
HASTINGS
14
Students,
School
High
of
Rights
Expression
Free
the
to
trines
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
9
to partisan
See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (dismissals from public employment due
political affiliation or nonaffiliation infringes upon first amendment rights).
0
' Goeking, supra note 8, at 894-900.
'"See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (well defined and narrowly limited exfirst
pression where content is of such slight social value that it can be restricted without violating the
amendment).
' 2 See, e.g., United States v. Grave, 462 U.S. 171 (1983) (statute preventing any demonstration on sidewalk
in front of the Supreme Court's building was in violation of the first amendment).
3
' See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (the Court held that any
attempts at prior restraint must bear a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality).
14See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (statute could not constitutionally make the display of a four-

letter expletive a criminal offense).
danger"
15Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (The Court extended Justice Holmes' "clear and present
incite
test to include speech which is "directed to inciting or producing inminent lawless action and is likely to
or produce such action").
16Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (calling another a "damned Facist" and a "damned racketeer" may be viewed
as likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace).
17See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) (state statute prohibiting the commercial use of
obscene material held valid); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscene material is unprotected
by the first amendment).
to the same stan18See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private individuals are not subject
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
dard in defamation suit as a public official or public figure); New York Times
were published with knowledge
(1964) (a public official or public figure must prove that defamatory statements
truth).
the
of their falsity of reckless disregard of
557, 563-66 (1980) (misleading
19See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
commercial speech is unprotected by the first amendment).
20
See New York v..Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (state statute prohibiting the sale of child pornography does
not violate the first amendment because it bears heavily on the welfare of children).
2

'Goeking, supra note 8, at 896.
22See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an ordinance restricting excessive
activity on property adjacent to a school during school hours).
2See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state law requiring
that solicitation of funds by religious groups be conducted from booths found to be a reasonable time, place,
and manner regulation).
24
See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (National Park Service regula-

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss2/10

2

Muse: The First Amendment Rights of Public High School Students
Fall, 19881

NOTES

5
speech. These restrictions must be narrowly tailored to prevent a specific activity.

Time, place, and manner restrictions at particular public places fall within
the realm of the public forum doctrine 2 6 The Supreme court has created three
types of public property to aid in analysis. In descending order of protectiveness,
they are: the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum.2 7 The court looks at the intent of the government in creating the
forum 38 The Court also looks at the nature of the property or medium of expres9
sion, and its compatibility with expressive activity?
One of the founding fathers' most feared means of restriction was prior restraint? 0 Prior restraint laws censor the speaker by requiring government approval
before the material is disseminated to the public?' The Supreme Court felt that2
the primary aim of the first amendment was to prevent pre-publication restraints?
The most celebrated case dealing with prior restraint, New York Times Co. v.
United States,33 prompted nine separate opinions. Not only did the Court hold
that the government carries a heavy burden in justifying prior restraint, but two
of the justices also argued that the press could never be subjected to prior
4
restraint?
The discussion of the first amendment to this point has dealt generally wita
restrictions on adults. The state derives its authority for restriction of children's
expression from the child's need for parental direction, and the state's interest in
educating future citizens. 35 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court
held that vulgar language could be restricted when the broadcast was at a time
of day when children may be in the audience.36 In Ginsberg v. New York, the
Supreme Court upheld a state statute prohibiting the sale of "obscene" material
to minors under seventeen, even though the material could not be withheld from
tion prohibiting sleeping in park in connection with a demonstration upheld as a reasonable restriction on
the manner in which a demonstration could be carried out).
25United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
26See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
27Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-6 (1983).
28Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
29Id. The federal government created a pamphlet with various charitable organizations in it. The pamphlet
was circulated to employees so they could contribute if they wished. Organizations which sought to influence
public policy or elections through lobbying and other methods were not permitted in the pamphlet. The NAACP
Legal Defense Fund and other similar groups were not permitted to participate. They challenged, contending the federal pamphlet was a public forum. The Supreme Court held that the government had not intended to create a public forum and could thus choose not to allow some organizations to be printed in the pamphlet.
30
New York limes Co., 376 U.S. at 716-18.
31

See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931) (Prior restraint laws traditionally required the speaker
to obtain a license from the government in order to publish the material).
32
1d. at 713.
33403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curium).

34Id. at 714.
35Garvey, Children and The FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 321, 333 (1979).
36
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 762, 749-50 (1978).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 22 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 10
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

adults.3 7 The Court upheld the law largely because it was structured to accom-

modate parental authority.38
First amendment restrictions on children generally ate in the form of pro39
tecting children from vulgar or obscene material. However, a different problem

is presented when it is a minor who is creating the material subject to restriction.
This situation usually arises in a public high school.40
An analysis of the first amendment in public high schools must begin with
4
linker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist. In Tinker, the Supreme Court recog-

nized that high school students maintain their constitutional rights inside the

schoolhouse.42 The Court also acknowledged the need to allow the state's local

authorities and school officials to determine conduct and control curriculum in

the schools.4 3 The linker court held that school officials may not disregard the

first amendment when implementing policy4 However, the Court recognized that
school officials may prevent student speech which interferes with the educational
process.4 5 Consequently, the Court held that undifferentiated fear of disturbance

46
is not enough to allow the violation of one's right to freedom of expression. The
Court adopted the standard that the students' conduct must substantially and
47

be restricted.
materially interfere with the educational process before it may
Since linker, the Courts have decided several cases dealing with high school
students' first amendment rights. The fourth circuit held that a school newspaper
was established and operated as a conduit for student expression and, as a result,
should be considered a public forum.48 The seventh circuit upheld students' first

amendment rights, holding that prior restraint of publication is unconstitutional
in a high school setting.49 The second circuit allowed school officials to prohibit
a student questionnaire and require prior submission of student publications for
approval.50 In Boardof Education v. Pico,51 the Supreme Court reiterated its stance
"7Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635-43 (1968).
38
d. at 639.
39See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 762 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
"'Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
41393 U.S. 503 (1969).
421d. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that... students... shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
431d. at 507 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).

"Id.
451d.

46d. at 508.
471d. at 509.

48Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board, 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), aftd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).
49Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d. 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
10See Tractman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d. Cir. 1977) (the Court allowed the school's prohibition of student
sponsored survey of student sexual attitudes and experiences because school psychologists feared harm to
some students); Eisner v. Stanford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d. Cir. 1971) (responsible and fair regulations for prior submission held not always unconstitutional).
s1457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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that although school officials have broad power to institute community standards,
they may not disregard the first amendment. In another recent case, the Supreme
Court held that school authorities may sanction a student for the use of offensively
lewd and indecent speech in a school sponsored assembly.5 2 The Court stated that
school authorities may employ such sanctions in exercise of their "in loco parentis" authority. 3 Thus far, the law allows high school students to enjoy their first
educational process or use
amendment rights, provided they do not disrupt the
54
rights.
their
exercising
in
vulgar or lewd speech
FACTS

Three students from East Hazelwood High School brought suit for violation
of their first amendment rights when the principal deleted articles from the school
newspaper before publication 5 The students were members of a journalism class
which printed the school newspaper, Spectrum5 6 The class was designed to give
5 7
the students first hand experience with the skills needed to publish a newspaper
58
The Board of Education provided most of the funding for the printing costs. As
a matter of procedure, the paper was given to the school principal for approval
before it was printed.9
Pages four and five of the May 13, 1983, edition of the Spectrum contained
articles dealing with teenage pregnancy, runaways, juvenile delinquents, and the
61
effects of divorce on children. 60 Three articles dealt with pregnancy. The
headlines above the articles were "Pressure Describes It All For Today's
Teenagers," and "Pregnancy Affects Many Teens Each Year." 62 The principle objected to the third article under this heading which consisted of personal accounts
of three students. 6 3 In the articles, each student discussed her reaction to becoming
pregnant, her plans for the future, her relationship with the father, the reaction
of her parents, details about her sex life, and her use or non-use of birth control
methods6 4 The articles on divorce contained statements by two students explaining
the reasons for their parents' divorce. 5
52Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
131d. at 3165. In loco parentis authority allows school officials to act in lieu of children's parents to protect
the children.
54
Slaff, Silencing Student Speech!, Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,37 AM. U.L. REV. 203 (1987).
55

Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
1d. at 565.

56
57

1d.

58

1d.

591d.

601d.
61

1d.

62607 F. Supp. 1450, 1457 (1985).
63

1d.

4

6 1d.
5

One student, identified as "a junior," was quoted as saying, "My dad didn't make any money, so my

6 1d.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
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The principal objected to the article on pregnancy because of its frank discussion of sex and birth control. The principal felt the younger students in the school
should not be subjected to such material.6 7 The principal was also concerned that
68
the identity of the pregnant girls had not been protected properly. The divorce
articles concerned the principal because the parents of the students interviewed
were identified, but not given an opportunity to respond.6 9
The district court determined that the Spectrum was a school-sponsored activity which subjected it to greater scrutiny by the school .OThe Court held that
under this determination, the principal was justified in preventing the pregnan7
cy article based on its mention of sex and birth control methods The Court further sided with the principal, agreeing with his determination that the pregnant
girls were subjected to an invasion of their rights because their identity was not
sufficiently protected 72 The Court found the same problem of invasion of privacy
existed regarding the divorce articles because the parents were not given an opportunity to respond73
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision
for three reasons: (1)the Spectrum was a "student publication and a public forum
' 74
because it was intended to be, and operated as, a conduit for student viewpoint;"
(2) censorship was not justified because the principal could not have reasonably
predicted that the articles would have materially disrupted classwork or caused
substantial disorder; 7 5 and (3) no tort action could have been maintained against
the high school because the girls involved agreed to be subjects of a newspaper
story, and the divorce article did not reveal any details of parents' lives or of the
fathers' identities to bring it within the realm of invasion of rights under the Tinker
test 7 6 The circuit court's analysis applied the Tinker "invasion of7 7rights" test in
the same manner as the tort liability test for invasion of privacy.
mother divorced him. My father was an alcoholic, and he always came home drunk, and my mom really
couldn't stand it any longer." Id. Another student, identified as "Diana Herbert" gave the following quote:
"My dad wasn't spending enough time with my mom, my sister, and I. He was always out of town on business
or out late playing cards with the guys. My parents always argued about everything. In the beginning, I thought
I caused the problem, but not I realized it wasn't me." Id. at 1457-58.
66
1d. at 1459.
67

1d.
68

1d. at 1460.

69

1d.

70

1d. at 1462-65.

71

d. at 1466.
721d. (citing linker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
73)d. at 1466-67.
74
1d. 795 F.2d. 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986).
71d. at 1375.
76
1d. Under inker, school officials are justified in suppressing student speech only if students' actions materially disrupt the teaching process and the speech would result in the invasion of another's privacy.
771d. The court borrowed the idea of using tort liability as a measure of the invasion of the rights of others
from a Michigan Law Review article. Note, AdministrativeRegulation of the High School Press, 83 MIcH.
L. REV. 625, 640 (1984).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss2/10
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The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and held that: (1)
the Spectrum did not qualify as a "public forum," therefore school officials could
impose reasonable restrictions; and (2) the principal's decision to delete two pages
on grounds that the article infringed on privacy rights of pregnant students did
not violate students' first amendment rights 78 The Court reasoned that the school
had sponsored the newspaper and thus, did not have to promote speech which it
found objectionable.7 9 The Court stated that the standard for determining when
a school may restrict student expression on school grounds, and the standard for
determining when a school may refuse to lend its name to publication, are substantially different 8o
ANALYSIS

Naturally school officials have some control over the educational process and
choice of curriculum. "The constitutional rights of students in public school do
not run parallel with the rights of adults in other settings." 8 1 However, "[i]t can
hardly be argued that either public high school students or teachers shed their con82
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
The Kuhlmeier Court seems to have disregarded this statement in reaching its
decision.
The EducationalSystem Requires Adherence to the First Amendment
High school students' constitutional rights serve to safeguard the liberties of
future adults rather than to preserve children's personal autonomy 3 The state's
interest in its future citizens is more apparent when it affirms the existence of
children's first amendment rights than when the rights are denied. 4 Although the
state has a compelling interest in the development of its future citizens, it does
not have the right to control students' input and output of ideas according to standards that it perceives to be the most desirable8 5 In West Virginia State Bd. of
Education v. Barnette,the Supreme Court advanced the idea that the proper formation of citizens is best assured not by a forced feeding of ideas, but by allowing students to experience first hand the freedoms they would later enjoy.8 6 Because
the educational process educates the young for citizenship, courts must protect
students' constitutional freedoms "if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
7

8Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 563, 568-69, 571-72 (1988).
791d. at 570.
80

1d.
Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
82 1inker, 393 U.S. at 506.
8
3S1aff, supra note 54, at 214.
24Garvey, supra note 35, at 336-37.
81

8

1Jd. at 337.

86319 U.S. 624, 637 (1983).
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platitudes." 87 The Tinker Court recognized the danger that arguments may arise
8
when differing opinions are discussed in school.! However, the Court realized
that the Constitution accepts the risk, and our history embraces this hazardous
89
freedom as the hallmark of our national strength. Thus, throughout the years,
amendment from
the Court has indicated that educators should not hide the first
90 When students atrights.
those
students, but should encourage them to exercise
tempt to speak out about societal realities, as the students of East Hazelwood High
did, school officials and the Court should lend a guiding hand, not a censoring ax.
The Tinker Court EstablishedSound Precedent
In reaching its decision, the Tinker Court explained that before school officials may prohibit a particular expression, they must show that the prohibition
is not motivated by a mere desire to avoid the discomfort that accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.9 The Tinker Court held that a student may express his views
with
during any hour of the school day if he does so without materially interfering
rights of others.92
the
with
colliding
without
and
discipline,
of
the requirements
Of course, the first amendment does not protect a student who materially disrupts
3
classwork or invades the rights of others? The Supreme Court's decision in Tinker
established a workable standard for dealing with high school students' exercise
of their first amendment rights. Good educational systems teach students to take
in new information and express it properly. So long as a student does not materially
disrupt the school community or invade the rights of others, the student should
be free to express himself or herself.
The Supreme Court applied Tinker in its analysis of Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser.94 The Court distinguished the sexual content of the Bethel stu5
dent's speech from the Tinker students' armbands. In Bethel, the Court relied
on earlier decisions which recognized school officials' "in loco parentis" authority
96
to protect children from sexual or vulgar language." Justice Marshall dissented
because he believed the school district failed to demonstrate that the remarks were
disruptive? 7 Justice Marshall commended the lower courts for applying the Tinker
871 d.
88

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 737-38.
1d. at 738.
90
See supra notes 86-88.
9t
TInker, 393 U.S. at 738.
92
1d. (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d. 744, 749 (1966)).
5th Cir. (1966)).
93
1d. (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. ofEduc., 363 F.2d 749 (C.A.
89

94

Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 106 S. Ct. at 3163.

95

1d.

sale of "obscene" material
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state statute prohibiting the
from adults); Board of
withheld
be
not
could
material
same
though
even
to minors under seventeen upheld
institute community stanEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (while school officials having broad power to
dards may not disregard the first amendment).
9
Bethel, 106 S. Ct. at 3163. The student in Bethel gave the following speech:
96

I know a man who is firm

-

he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm
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test and concurred in their finding.9 8 Justice Stevens, in his Bethel dissent, indicated that the student who gave the speech was in a better position to determine
whether an audience of his peers would be offended by his sexual metaphor than
a group of judges who are at least two generations and 3,000 miles away?9 Justice
Stevens makes sense.
Similarly, the students in Kuhlmeier were probably in the best position to
know if the articles in question would disrupt the school. Justice Brennan dissented
in Kuhlmeier, indicating that the Court distinguished Tinker because it could not
find any precedent which fit its point of view. 00
Application of Tinker
Rather than apply the Tinker test, the Kuhlmeier court created a distinction
which would enable it to suppress material which the judges found personally objectionable.1 0 1 For support, the Court offered three excuses for allowing the
educators greater control over school-sponsored speech than the Tinker test would
allow. 0 2 Justice Brennan enumerated these excuses as: (1)the public educator's
prerogative to control curriculum; (2) the educational interest in protecting
students from objectionable viewpoints; (3) and the school's need to disassociate
itself from student expression. 0 3 Precisely because educators control curriculum,
the Court should apply the Tinker test rather than abandon it.104 Tinker would allow
the suppression of speech in a curriculum forum only if it materially disrupted
05
the educational process.
The school's pedagogical interest is not an excuse to suppress viewpoints or
material that it does not agree with. In Board of Education v. Pico,10 6 the Court
held that school officials may not remove books from school library shelves
because the books offend the officials' social, political, and moral tastes. 0 7 Thus,
the Court's second excuse has no merit.
most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhiman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail
it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally
- he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end even - the climax, for each and every one of you."
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. Vice-President - he'll never come between you and the best our high
school can be.
98

1d.

99

1d. at 3169.
10'Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 575.
"O'Seeid. and accompanying text.
1°2Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 576.
1031d.
1041d.

106457 U.S. 852 (1982).

1'71d. at 858.
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The Court emphasized the fact that the Spectrum was school sponsored. 08
The Court applied a different standard because the views of the paper could have
been erroneously attributed to the school. 0 9 In his dissent, Justice Brennan wisely
points out that other means, short of censorship, could have been used to
disassociate the school from the paper.'10 The school could have required the
students to attach a disclaimer indicating that the views of the students did not
reflect those of the school. Alternatively, the school could have issued a response
explaining its position, and indicating why it believed the students were wrong."'
CONCLUSION

The Kunlmeier Court missed a golden opportunity to explain and clarify the
standards established in Tinker. Instead, the Court increased the confusion over
where the line should be drawn between students' first amendment rights, and
the state's interest in restricting student speech. The Court abandoned sound precedent. Apparently, the court chose to distinguish Tinker solely because of the
justices' own values.
School officials must deter conduct which is inconsistent with the school's
purpose of effective education. However, school officials must recognize that
students enjoy first amendment rights, with only a few exceptions. Students, as
future citizens, must learn to express their views in a proper manner. The
Kuhlmeier school officials prevented student speech, on topics that pertained to
students, in a student newspaper. The Supreme Court's and school authorities'
subjective values must not dictate the scope of students' first amendment rights.
EDWARD S. MUSE

'OsKuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570.
1091d.

"Old. at 579.
1111d.
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